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Crisis of the Croatian Second Republic (1990-1999): 
Transition to Totalitarianism or to Democracy?* 
 









 Three sets of problems are set forth in detail. These sets outline the most 
significant totalitarian features of Croatian political and social life between 1990-
1999. The first set is the ideological project of national sovereignty, defined by 
the political program of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). The second set 
relates to the systemic position of the HDZ’s president as head of state. The third 
deals with the HDZ’s policy towards the neighbouring state of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. 
 This analysis shows that the central problem of Croatian political circum-
stances lay in the inability of HDZ to structure the public and political space as a 
state, and the social field as a civil society. Thus, the HDZ is the source of totali-
tarian tendencies in the Croatian state. However, these were not the dominant 
features of the Croatian political and social order, since HDZ was not ideologi-
cally and politically powerful enough to shape the Croatian state and society in its 
own image. The Croatian Second Republic did not become a totalitarian commu-
nity, but an authoritarian state with marked totalitarian features, but also with an 
increasingly more pronounced democratic and liberal potential. 
 
 The Croatian First Republic existed within the Yugoslav federation until the first 
competitive multiparty elections (that is from 1944 to 1990). The Croatian Second Re-
public was normatively institutionalized with a liberal democratic constitution (end of 
1990) while Croatia was still within the old state frame. Nevertheless, partly eschewing 
that constitution and partly counter to it, the Croatian political order was until the end of 
1999 decisively determined by the historical context of the emergence of the Croatian 
state, that is primarily by the character of the Yugoslav, and therefore also Croatian “an-
cien régime”, and then by the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav federal state which 
collapsed under the force of the Serbian hegemonic national project. It is within that 
context that the political program and the type of action of the Croatian national popular 
movement were set up (as “the movement to defend Croatia”).  
 
* The first draft of this study was written in November 1998 as a contribution to the research project “The 
Rule of Law in Croatia: Obstacles and Perspectives” (according to the Agreement on Cooperation between the 
Croatian Law Center and the Institute for Federalism, Fribourg, Switzerland, dated 18 February 1998). There-
fore, the text was written long before the change of the government in 2000. 
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 1. Fundamental Dilemma: an Authoritarian and/or Totalitarian State? 
 This analysis of the political order in Croatia (between 1990-1999) is based on the 
categories of the standard comparatist typology of contemporary states1. The conclusion 
ought to prove the validity of two key theses: first, that the state of Croatia was for the 
most part an authoritarian state with distinct and strong totalitarian features and rudi-
mentary democratic characteristics; second, that the main problem of Croatia’s political 
situation lies in the inability to constitute the politico-public space as a state, and to con-
stitute the social field as a modern (and above all, a civil and civilized) society. 
 My intention is to focus on the fundamental assumption about the authoritarian char-
acter of the state of Croatia by means of an analytical confrontation with the theoretical 
diagnoses of its essentially totalitarian character. It would be superfluous to view it in 
opposition to the ideological apologiae which non-critically ramble about the “miracles” 
of Croatian democracy. 
 The best analysis of Croatian totalitarianism so far was provided by D. Hlad in 1994. 
According to Hlad, in Croatia, a total permeating of society by the political authority is 
at work. The process is effectuated by terror, the “true essence of totalitarian govern-
ment”. The terror in question is the “permanently looming danger of war”, in the sense 
of the constant ideological production of enemies (both external and internal), inciting 
the nationally aware masses to a holy war as the ultimate confrontation with Evil. The 
political regime in Croatia founded upon an ideological project of the sort, upon Cro-
atian nationalism as the ideology of the state (“Croatian Nazism”), must undoubtedly be 
recognized as totalitarian2. 
 Are the described tendencies really as predominant as the preceding analysis 
unambiguously suggests? In my opinion, in order to solve the dilemma we must inevi-
tably consult the theoretically precise critical diagnosis by I. Padjen and M. Matulović. 
The authors claim that neither the Croatian state nor the Croatian society can be viewed 
as “predominantly fascist”. Indeed, they “believe that the present Croatian regime, 
which was installed in 1990, can be characterized most appropriately as a rudimentary 
democracy with strong authoritarian and dictatorial elements” (italics added). The most 
distinct “fascist tendencies” are cleverly outlined. The following insight should be 
highlighted: the ruling party – Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ, Croatian De-
 
 1 As exposed, for example, in the famous work Traité de science politique (sous la direction de Madelaine 
Grawitz et Jean Leca), tome II: Les régimes politiques contemporains, Paris: PUF, 1985; in particular part one: Les 
types de régimes (ch.: La démocratie, pp. 29-114; ch.: Le totalitarisme, pp. 115-268; ch.: L’Autoritarisme, pp. 269-
312). I shall rely upon this typology, although it is heuristically questionable. This is clearly shown by the theoreti-
cal vagueness of the very notion of the “State”. I intentionally set aside the essential insight of Foucault’s decisive 
analysis of the formative function of the political power and its potential of normalization in a modern State as 
such. If, in the so-called “disciplinary societies”, the political shapes and permeates an individual’s life in its en-
tirety, then totalitarianism is immanent in all states i.e. in all political bodies whose soul is the political power. 
 2 See Dragutin Hlad, Zov divljine. HND versus HDZ , Zagreb: Misl, 1995, pp. 54-56. It is important to note 
that Hlad’s critical approach is based upon Franz L. Neumann’s analytical matrix and his notion of “totalitarian 
dictatorship”. Comp. The Democratic and Authoritarian State, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957, in particular 
ch.: On the Theory of Dictatorship, pp. 243-245. 
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mocratic Union) – is totally intertwined with the state, as the monopolistic party with 
the complete control over the military and the police, the national media and the key 
economic resources. The study ends with the assertion that the mentioned fascist ten-
dencies markedly weakened after the end of the war in 1995, with the key role per-
formed by the international environment3.  
 With all due respect for this analysis of the “fascist tendencies” in Croatia today, I 
must express certain doubts regarding the adequacy of the notions of “fascism” and 
“fascist tendencies”. The problem is terminological: however precisely stated, the term 
retains a politico-symbolical meaning of the magnum crimen. It blurs and conceals even 
the most subtle notional determination of fascism as an ideology, a movement and a re-
gime. Moreover, in such a notional determination of fascism it is impossible to discern 
with sufficient clarity the difference between fascism as an authoritarian state and Na-
zism as a “non-state”4 or a “so-called totalitarian state”5. For this reason, I wish to point 
out that the present work deals with totalitarianism as a Behemoth, as the anti-state and 
antisocial state of chaos and anarchy, in which “the Party has become the State” 
(Hitler)6. 
 
 2. Totalitarian traits of the Croatian State (between 1990-1999)  
 I will investigate in detail the three issues in which I recognize the most important 
totalitarian traits of the political and social order in Croatia. The first is the ideological 
project of national sovereignty which used to determine the programme profile of the 
HDZ. The second refers to the systemic position of HDZ’s president as head of state. 
The third and the last deals with HDZ’s policy towards the neighbouring state of Bosnia 




 3 See Ivan L. Padjen and Miomir M. Matulović, Cleansing the Law of Legal Theory: A View from Croatia 
(editorial), Croatian Critical Law Review, vol 1, no. 1, pp. 1-122 (in particular ch. 3.2.: Building the State contra 
legem, pp. 62-67, from which the quotation is taken). I. Padjen’s text Fašističke tendencije u današnjoj Hrvatskoj 
offers a more complete and precise definition of fascism and “fascist tendencies” in Croatia. The text was read at 
the conference Nove demokracije u poslijeratnoj tranziciji (New democracies in the post-war transition), Zagreb, 
13-14 December 1996. 
 4 See Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933-1944, New York, 
Octagon Books, inc. 1963; reprint of the second, enlarged edition from 1944. 
 5 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, vol III: Totalitarianism, ch. 2, New York, Harcourt, 
Brace & World, 1966; third edition. 
 6 The works of Pierre Birnbaum are indispensable in this respect, especially: Dimensions du pouvoir (Paris: 
PUF, 1984); ch. VII: La mobilisation contre l’Etat, at 149-156 and ch. IX: L’introuvable Etat totalitaire: l’exemple 
du pouvoir hitlerien, at 167-190; see also Id., Critiques du “totalitarisme”, in the book P. Ory and others, Nouvelle 
histoire des idées politiques (Paris: Hachette, 1987); ch. V, 5.3.1, at 722-733; Id., L’action de l’Etat, differentiation 
et dédifferentiation, in Traité de science politique, vol. 3: L’action politique, ch. X, at 645-682. 
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 2.1. National sovereignty as an ideological project 
 First of all, I must deal with the political programme and the mode of action of the 
dominant political formation in Croatia, which refused to view itself as one of the par-
ties in Croatia’s political life. I am talking about the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), 
once a massive political movement, whose programme identity found its unambiguous 
expression in the advocacy of Croatian sovereignty. Ever since its foundation in 1989, 
the HDZ asserted it was the central, if not the only party to support such a political pro-
gramme. Being a popular movement with hegemonic ambitions, its mode of action after 
the state of Croatia has become independent and internationally recognized quite obvi-
ously demonstrated HDZ’s essentially ambivalent character as a political formation. On 
the level of its programme the HDZ was contradiction incarnated, since it ideologically 
projected and politically imposed the national (ethnic) sovereignty as different from the 
national (legal) sovereignty. Or, more precisely, an essentially totalitarian aspect of the 
HDZ as a political formation is manifest in the advocacy of national sovereignty pri-
marily as a constitutive principle of the Croatian (despotic) state (Nation-Etat)7, and 
then only as a principle of legitimization of a democratic national state (Etat-Nation)8. 
With an ideological project of the sort, the HDZ practically made it impossible to con-
stitute Croatia as a sovereign (legal) state. Namely, after Croatia had become independ-
ent and the state of war ended, this national (ethnic) political project proved to be the 
chief obstacle to the constitution of the sovereign state of Croatia. The very logic of 
constituting the Croatian state as a democratic political community effaced all the rea-
sons for and the possible existence of a movement or a party which, by its very pro-
gramme, would bring about the project in question. In this way, the national movement 
for the independence of Croatia underwent an essential and necessary political reduc-
tion. It was transformed into a nationalist movement which reduced the state of Croatia 
to a mere tool for the realization of its ideological project of national sovereignty. 
 The ideological project of national sovereignty as a constitutional principle gradu-
ally transformed the HDZ into an anti-state political formation, which questioned the 
very possibility of a democratic formation of the general political will as the will of all 
citizens of the state of Croatia. For example, if the fundamental characteristic of a state 
 
 7 Cf. Alfred Cobban, Dictatorship. Its History and Theory (New York: Haskel House Publishers, 1971); first 
published in 1939, ch. VI: The Development of the Totalitarian State, par. 2: The Totalitarian Conception of the 
State, at 174-188. 
 8 According to B. Barret-Kriegel’s fundamental distinction between the two types of modern states, namely 
the legal (sovereign) and the despotic states. A legal (sovereign) state is a particular historical type of state, which 
assumed its final form in Western Europe during the 17th and 18th century, especially in England, France and 
Holland (in historiography it is referred to as the national State: Etat-Nation). There the organization of sovereign 
authority submits the political power to law, thus making the political power a guarantor of the legal peace and se-
curity of the citizens. The other, much more widespread type of modern state is the despotic state. It is institution-
alized in the form of a national state (Nation-Etat) and a single-party, totalitarian state (Parti-Etat). In the present-
day despotic state, although the fundamental freedoms and certain social rights are formally guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, the political power is above the law and right, and basically dominates all spheres of social life. Comp. 
Blandine Barret-Kriegel, L’Etat et les esclaves. Réflexions pour l’histoire des Etats (Paris: Payot, 1986); 1st ed. 
1979; pp. 39-112, 179-221, 236-37. See also Blandie Kriegel, Démocratie et Etat de droit, ch. in the book: Les 
paradigmes de la démocratie (Paris: PUF, 1994); edited by Jacques Bidet, at 103-112. 
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as a sovereign political body is its capability to limit its political power to its territory 
and its citizens, then the amendment to the Croatian electoral law enacted on the eve of 
the parliamentary elections in the autumn of 1995 basically made it impossible to con-
stitute a sovereign state. This amendment (which is still operative) established the elec-
toral right for the nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Croatian descent (Croatian 
citizens in the ethnic sense of the word) to elect 12 (out of 127) representatives to the 
House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament (Sabor)9. Such a heteronomous 
element in the construction of the Croatian representative authority fitted perfectly in 
with the logic of the national sovereignty project as a constitutional principle, since the 
legislative will was co-formed by nationals of another sovereign state. But, on the other 
hand, it is quite contrary to the logic of the legal sovereignty of the state, because it 
makes it impossible for Croatia to be constituted as a democratic republic. And what is 
more, the fact that all the representatives elected in this manner were HDZ members in-
stitutionalizes the political formation called the Croatian Democratic Union as a politi-
cal community which is above the state. Further still, it was the Croatian Parliament or-
ganized in the described fashion (and no longer the Parliament of the Republic of Croa-
tia in the strict sense) which was renamed into the Parliament of the State of Croatia 
(autumn 1997)10. The Croatian Parliament by definition is no longer – nor can it possi-
bly be – the Parliament of the state of Croatia, unless we should assume that it antici-
pates a future national state (Nation-Etat) on a larger territory, which would comprise 
the Croatian national (ethnic) body of the neighbouring BiH, together with the corre-
sponding territory11. 
 
 9 Comp. Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama zakona o izborima zastupnika u Sabor Republike Hrvatske , 
Narodne novine, no. 68, arts 1 and 24a: “Twelve representatives are elected to the House of Representatives by 
voters who are not residents of the Republic of Croatian, based on special lists”. In Croatia proper the mixed elec-
toral model is applied (80 seats from the party state-lists, 32 seats in the electoral units according to the majority 
system), and the “members of ethnic and national communities or minorities have the right to elect 8 representa-
tives to the House of Representatives.” Apart from that, the “members of the Serbian ethnic community or minority 
elect 3 representatives in the electoral unit which encompasses the entire territory of the Croatian Republic” (art. 
58a). 
 10 See Ustavni zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Ustava Republike Hrvatske (The Constitutional Law on the 
Amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia), Narodne novine, No. 135 (1997), art. 2. The constitu-
tional law adopted on 12 December 1997 includes the following major amendment: in the first sentence of Art. 45: 
“All citizens of the Republic (of Croatia) /.../ shall have universal suffrage”, the words “All citizens of the Republic” 
are replaced by “All Croatian citizens” (art. 7 of the constitutional law; italics added). 
 11 In the first parliamentary elections (for the House of Representatives), organized according to this electoral 
model, the special list of the HDZ (for the Diaspora) won exactly 90.02% (i.e. all 12 mandates), from a total of 
97,102 Croatian citizens living outside Croatia. The official paper reported: “Exactly 82,914 Croatian citizens who 
are permanent residents of BiH have taken part in the elections for the Croatian Parliament. They have for the most 
part voted for the HDZ’s special list candidates for the Diaspora. According to the information from the Croatian 
embassy in Sarajevo, HDZ’s candidates on the special list won 91.58% of the votes in BiH, followed by HSP with 
2.66%, HSP 1861 with 1.15%.”. See Vjesnik, 7 November 1995, p. 2. 
One must inevitably agree with the following comment: “When HDZ made it possible for several members of 
the party’s BiH branch to obtain seats in the Croatian Parliament, it once more exposed the rest of the Croatian 
people in that country to unpredictable trials /.../ Isn’t such a move some sort of a political “annexation” of one part 
of the territory and the citizens of the neighbouring and allegedly friendly state?” See M. Kasapović, Kako se mo-
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 It was therefore logical that even the top state officials with legislative authority in 
the state would have had to oppose the totalitarian dissipation of the state as a politico-
public space and its mechanisms of regulation. They also had to counter the anti-con-
stitutional strengthening of the Party’s practice of repression and control which tended 
to permeate the entire society. Although those officials were at the same time members 
of the Party’s presidency, the logic of their state functions impelled them to advocate 
the autonomy of the Parliament and to respect the democratic procedure in the Parlia-
ment when deliberating on Croatia’s strategic problems. Through politically extorted 
statesmen activity, they strongly publicly opposed the autocratic governing methods of 
the Party apparatus led by its charismatic leader (and at the same time the Republic’s 
President). The conflict first arose in the HDZ, at its second convention in October 
1993. The result was the so-called parliamentary crisis which lasted from March till 
June of 1994. Forced to quit their state functions were Chairman of the Croatian Parlia-
ment (and the House of Representatives) and Chairman of the House of Counties. They 
later formed a new political party – the Croatian Independent Democrats (HND). It 
found its raison d’etre in the opposition to the “totalitarian, authoritarian and anti-de-
mocratic methods and political forces which lead us to a single-party system and to 
onemindedness”12. Although the direct consequences of the solution to the crisis were 
the solidification of the authoritarian methods of government in the party and the state, 
as well as further marginalization of HDZ’s parliamentary fraction, still the new party 
(through non-electoral parliamentarization) did at least for a time strengthen the politi-
cal ambitions and control the capacities of the Croatian opposition. 
 
glo dopustiti da general Mladen Markač u uniformi i naoružan, govori u predizbornoj kampanji HDZ-a na otva-
ranju jedne crkve? (How could General Mladen Markač have been allowed to speak in HDZ’s election campaign 
on the occasion of opening of a church in full uniform and armed?), Globus, No. 256, 3 November 1995, p. 4. 
 12 This is how the Initiative Circle of the party of Croatian Independent Democrats warned the Croatian public 
of the necessity to prevent that “fear and ominous silence should reign in Croatia, essential for the current HDZ’s 
Presidency in order to impose an authoritarian personal regime on Croatia” (signed by Stjepan Mesić and Josip 
Manolić, while they were still in the Parliament). They stress that the parliamentary system and the legal state 
mechanisms in Croatia (concerning the protection of human rights) do not function because of the anti-democratic 
policy of the “state” Party and that the “President of the Republic rules in an authoritarian way, extending his al-
ready broad constitutional powers”. With a rhetorical questions: “Who made the decision to wage the war in BiH, 
who sent the Croatian army there, who and on what grounds financed that war, who presently interferes without the 
Parliament’s approval in the internal affairs of a foreign state, who illegally appoints the State’s Judical Council”?, 
they quite unambiguously pointed out the extraordinary state of suspension of parliamentary democracy, as well as 
the total and politically fatal concentration of political power in the hands of the Republic’s President. Comp. 
Razlika između stranačke politike i države, Vjesnik, 29 April 1994, p. 2. This daring and democratic step of a part 
of HDZ’s Presidency against the dominant totalitarian policy of the Party was a very important stage in the 
democratization of Croatian political life. The texts and interviews of the principal figure in the HDZ party schism, 
Josip Manolić, testify quite convincingly to the fact, particularly his resolute reply to the political imputations by the 
HDZ’s president (in Tuđman’s speech at the assembly of the Club of the HDZ Representatives, held on 7 April 
1994; the stenograph was published in the Nedjeljni Vjesnik, 10 April 1994, pp. 6-7). Manolić’s reply was pub-
lished in the Nedjeljni Vjesnik on 17 April 1994, pp. 4-5. He concludes that Croatia is being called into question by 
“Your policy so far, which has brought us to the edge of the abyss” (l.c.). The interested reader can find information 
on this episode in the following books: Josip Manolić, Javni intervjui i javni nastupi 1989.-1995. Zagreb: Misl, 
1995, edited by D. Hlad; and D. Hlad, Zov divljine (see Note 2). 
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 I refer to the so-called parliamentary crisis merely to illustrate the political identity 
of the HDZ. Namely, a more careful inspection of HDZ’s character in a diachronic di-
mension shows with sufficient clarity that the HDZ did not succeed in becoming a 
hegemonic party in a non-competitive party system. Ever since 1995, or perhaps even 
further back, it was becoming increasingly clear that the HDZ can “only” be the pre-
dominant party in a competitive predominant-party system (with limited and polarised 
pluralism)13. Moreover, the results of the elections at the county and local levels from 
autumn 1995 till autumn 1998 testify to a gradual transformation of a strongly semi-
competitive (1992-95) into a more competitive electoral system, which is characteristic 
of the liberal-democratic pluralistic states14. 
 
 13 Comp. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and party systems. A framework for analysis, vol. 1, New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1976. The predominant party, as the strongest party in the parliament (with the absolute 
majority of mandates, but not necessarily of votes of the electoral body as well), exercises power by itself in the 
conditions of party pluralism (where smaller parties are not only permitted but play a legal and legitimate role in 
political life, with the right and the real possibilities of public disapproval). The hegemonic party, on the other hand, 
exists solely in non-competitive party and political systems. If we accept Sartori’s criterion that “three successive 
absolute majorities of parliamentary mandates” are sufficient proof that the system is of the predominant type, then 
the party system in Croatia cannot as yet be considered as predominant. Namely, in the two elections held so far (in 
1992 and 1995 for the House of Representatives, in 1993 and 1997 for the House of Counties), the HDZ won the 
absolute majority of the seats in the Principal or Lower House of the Parliament (although it never got more than 
45-odd percent of the vote). The distance from the second best party, though, always exceeded Sartori’s 10% 
minimum. So, the next elections for the legislature, to be held in 1999, will finally show whether the HDZ has suc-
ceeded in stabilizing its predominant position (comp. Sartori, op.cit., pp. 192-201, 214-216, 231-239). The follow-
ing studies are relevant for the understanding of the Croatian party system: Nenad Zakošek, Polarizacijske struk-
ture, obrasci političkih uvjerenja i hrvatski izbori 1990, in the book: Ivan Grdešić and others, Hrvatska u izborima 
90., Zagreb: Naprijed, 1990, pp. 131-187; Id. Struktura i dinamika hrvatskoga stranačkog sustava, Revija za Socio-
logiju, vol. XXV, No. 1-2, 1994, pp. 23-39; Id., Ideološki rascjepi i stranačke preferencije hrvatskih birača. in the 
book: M. Kasapović, I. Šiber and N. Zakošek, Birači i demokracija, Zagreb: Alinea, 1998, pp. 11-50; Mirjana 
Kasapović, Izborni i stranački sustav Republike Hrvatske, Zagreb: Alinea, 1992; Id., Demokratska tranzicija i poli-
tičke stranke. Razvoj političkih stranaka i stranačkih sustava u Istočnoj Europi, Zagreb: Fakultet političkih 
znanosti, 1996; in part. chap. IV: Hrvatska: demokratska tranzicija, političke institucije i stranke, pp. 153-178. 
 14 Comp. Dieter Nohlen, Izborno pravo i stranački sustav, Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1992, p. 23. The Croatian 
elections, from 1992 till 1998 can be described as the semi-competitive type of elections, where the power relations 
are not questioned, but the power-holders still demand that they be legitimized by elections. According to Nohlen, 
the principal function of the elections of the type is the stabilization of authoritarian regimes (“neither quite West-
ern-liberal nor absolutely repressive”). This type permits the existence of the opposition, which was proved in 
Croatia by the results of the elections at the county level. In that sense, the first important but temporary success of 
the united opposition was the electoral victory of the coalition of the opposition parties in the city of Zagreb in 1995 
(see infra note 17). The last, subsequent county elections testified to the gradual and significant, although not yet 
decisive, change of relations between the political forces: the elections in the Primorsko-goranska County were 
held on 30 November 1997; in the 40-member County Assembly, the predominant coalition “family” with the so-
cial-democratic party up front won 29 mandates, whereas the coalition “Croatian reply”, led by the HDZ, won only 
eight. See Obitelji 29, “Hrvatskom odgovoru” 8 i IDS-u 3 vijećnička mjesta (Family gets 29, “Croatian Reply” gets 
8, and IDS 3 council seats), Novi list, 2 December 1997, p. 3. But, although the HDZ’s electoral defeat was ex-
pected there (though not as drastic), it suffered a much more significant defeat in the Dubrovačko-neretvljanska 
County – on the elections held on 11 October 1998, the united opposition won 25, and the HDZ only 13 seats in the 
County Assembly (out of 40; N. Barač’s independent list won two). The descending tendency of the HDZ is the 
main issue here (it previously had 20 seats), as well as the ascendancy of the Social-democratic party as the leader 
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2.2. President of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) versus President of the 
Croatian Republic 
 The additional significance of the parliamentary crisis consisted in the direct 
questioning of the systemic position of the President from the viewpoint of the internal 
logic of Croatian parliamentarism. Numerous experts provided explanations why the in-
stitutional model of the so-called semi-presidential system, in imitation of the French 
model, can be functional in a situation where the political body is ideologically consid-
erably fragmented, the constitutional consensus does not exist, and the civil society is 
insufficiently liberalized and therefore incapable of expressing itself adequately in a 
pluralistic fashion by means of a pure parliamentary system15. In its politico-constitu-
tional system, Croatia took over the institution of the head of state, which is the most 
powerful organ of political authority and the central figure of the entire polity. There-
fore, in Croatia too the president of the Republic is conceived as the fundamental insti-
tution of a sovereign legal state; they are the democratic arbiters and the constitutional 
guardians of the order’s political stability, and are legitimized by universal direct suf-
frage. It is this central institution that is the permanent focal point where the real tension 
of the actual Croatian republic is revealed most obviously and most intensely. It is only 
in so far as the President consistently operates as the state’s public and above-all-parties 
leader of all citizens, as the Prime Citizen of the Croatian Republic, that he essentially 
coforms Croatia as a national State of the democratic type (a sovereign Etat-Nation). If, 
on the other hand, he should predominantly or primarily act as an autocrat, as the char-
ismatic leader of a pan-national movement (of all “Croatian citizens”), or even as the 
providential figure of national salvation, then a national state of the despotic type would 
be at work (a totalitarian Nation-Etat). In Croatia too it turned out too that the President 
could effectively perform both political functions only for a certain period of time, in 
the initial state of emergency. First, he stood as the highest official of the supreme 
power in a republic endangered by war and rebellion (as corroborated by the formation 
and activity of the multiparty government of democratic unity during the most critical 
period from October 1991 till June 1992). Second, he was the leader of a massive na-
tional movement for whom the state was but a means of advancing “general” national 
goals. 
 Of course, the elected President of Croatia made a solemn vow to perform the duty 
of the President of all citizens of Croatia, which is his sole legitimate and constitutional 
 
of the opposition (it got 10 seats instead of the previous 4). See Izbori u Dubrovačko-neretvljanskoj županiji. 
Oporba porazila HDZ, SDP-u župan, Baraču dva mjesta, Jutarnji list, 13 October 1998, p. 5. 
 15 Comp. Štefica Deren-Antoljak, Položaj predsjednika Republike u političkom sustavu Pete Republike u 
Francuskoj , Politička misao, vol. XXVIII, No. 1, 1991, pp. 57-74; Arsen Bačić, Konstitucionalizam i podjela vlasti 
u “reaktivnim” ustavima postkomunistièkog razdoblja, Politička misao, vol. XXIX, No. 1, 1992, pp. 42-55; Id. Iz-
borni zakoni i polupredsjednički sistem, Politička misao, vol. XXIX, No. 2, 1992, pp. 39-47; Id. “Republikanska” 
monarhija i ustavni inženjering s kraja stoljeća, Politička misao, vol. XXXIV, No. 1, 1997, pp. 30-46; Smiljko 
Sokol, Predsjednički sustav i parlamentarizam, Politička misao, vol. XXIX, No. 3, 1992, pp. 4-17; M. Kasapović, 
Parlamentarizam i prezidencijalizam u Istočnoj Europi , Politička misao, vol. XXXIV, No. 1, 1997, pp. 5-20; Ivan 
Padjen, Uredbe iz nužde hrvatskog predsjednika: mjerodavnost francuskog javnog prava, Politička misao, vol. 
XXXIII, No. 1, 1996, pp. 149-165; N. Bulat, (Polu)predsjednički sustav i predsjednički izbori, chap. in the book 
Pohod na birače. Izbori u Hrvatskoj 1990-1993. , Srđan Vrcan and others, Split: Puls, 1995., pp. 295-316. 
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duty. His activities, however, showed that he nurtured strong aspirations to assume the 
non- and supra- constitutional role of the “President of all Croats” (in the ethnic and 
historical sense). Those aspirations became obvious at the time of the first post-war 
elections, after the Serb rebellion had been crushed by military force in August 1995. 
He then refused to accept the results of the elections for the Assembly of the city of Za-
greb, won by the united opposition. Breaking the elementary rules of democratic proce-
dure, the president of the HDZ refused to act as the president of the Republic, the 
guardian of the constitution and of the stability. In this way he triggered off the so-
called Zagreb crisis which, thanks to his conduct, lasted from October 1995 to May 
1997 and was not solved in a democratic fashion 16. This historical episode is the best il-
 
 16 The local elections for the Assembly of the City of Zagreb were held by the mixed electoral model; out of 
50 councillors, 33 were elected by the proportional system (party lists) and 17 by the majority system in uninominal 
electoral units. Since the united opposition appeared together in the electoral units, it won a total of 31 seats, while 
the HDZ won 17 mandates (plus two mandates won by the satellite right-wing party HSP). On the grounds of the 
post-electoral coalition of seven parties of the opposition (the strongest two were: the Croatian Social-Liberal Party 
with 10 mandates and the Social-Democratic Party of Croatia with 9 mandates), Goran Granić (HSLS) was pro-
posed as city mayor, and Zdravko Tomac (SDPH) as Chairman of the City’s Assembly (Vjesnik, 15 November 
1995, p. 6). The founding meeting of the City’s Assembly, held on 2 December 1995, attended by councillors of 
the opposition parties alone, unanimously voted for the previously agreed upon proposal. At a press conference, ac-
counting for their absence from the meeting, the HDZ’s delegates entered an open political confrontation with the 
opposition by asserting that “HDZ cannot accept people who wrote the programme to destabilize the Sabor” (I. 
Pašalić’s comment on dr. Goran Granić, the HSLS candidate for city mayor; see Večernji list, 3 December 1995, p. 
4). On the same day, president of the HSLS, Dražen Budiša, retorted that the standpoint of the HDZ “introduces 
political chaos and a constitutional crisis” (ibid.). This is then how the so-called Zagreb crisis began. However, 
since the HDZ (and HSP) delegates obstructed the meeting, the formal condition of constituting an assembly was 
not fulfilled. The Provisional rules of order for the work of the City’s Assembly state that at least two thirds of the 
councillors must be present (33 out of 50). For this reason the government annulled the founding meeting, and the 
Constitutional Court confirmed its decision. The meeting was finally held on 2 January 1996, with all 50 delegates 
present; the opposition once more voted for the same candidates. Although the results of the voting were totally by 
the book in the procedural sense, HDZ refused to accept them resorting to the legal prescript that the President of 
the Republic must confirm the elected mayor. The president of the HDZ and the head of state refused to confirm 
any of the mayoral candidates the opposition proposed from January till April 1996, with no explanation whatso-
ever. Every liberal politician, from dr. G. Granić, J. Radoš or I. Škrabalo, to D. Budiša (who performed the function 
of the Parliament’s Deputy Chairman!) were declared unfit to be the mayor of Zagreb. And on top of that, on 11 
March 1996, HDZ’s President of the State appointed Marina Matulović-Dropulić as the HDZ’s mayor of Zagreb. 
But the opposition majority in the City’s Assembly refused to accept such a dictate, passing a vote of no confidence 
to the appointed mayor and electing their third candidate I. Škrabalo (at the meeting on 7 March 1996); in spite of 
that, Mrs. Matulović-Dropulić assumed the duty solely on the grounds of the decision of the President. Since the 
majority of the Assembly again passed a vote of no confidence, the HDZ’s government decided on 1 May 1996, to 
dissolve the City’s Assembly and to appoint a government commissioner in Zagreb, Stjepan Brœlich (till then 
Deputy Chairman of the City’s Assembly and Chairman of the HDZ club within the dissolved Assembly). Judging 
that the government’s decision is contrary to “the laws and Constitution of the Republic of Croatia and implies the 
automatic cancelling of the electoral results and the multiparty system, and jeopardizes the basic rights of the citi-
zens”, the president of the dissolved Assembly Z. Tomac retorted by a constitutional appeal, demanding that “the 
Constitutional Court cancel the Decision on the dissolving of the Assembly of the City of Zagreb of April 30” (see 
Vjesnik, 5 May 1996, p. 5). On 10 May 1996, the Constitutional Court accepted the constitutional appeal by major-
ity vote (with the exception of the notorious M. Vuković) and cancelled the Decision of the government of the Re-
public of Croatia, arguing that such “acts of the government violate the basic precepts of the Constitution of the Re-
public of Croatia from Article 1 Paragraph 2 and Article 5 Paragraph 2, precepts from Article 19 Paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution and the guarantee from Chapter VI of the Constitution – Organization of local self-government and 
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lustration of the fundamental contradiction of a president who made no distinction be-
tween the common good of the Republic and the particular interests of the political 
group which was individually and electorally the strongest in Croatia . 
 The most obvious proof that he put his “democratic union” (HDZ) ahead of the 
Croatian Republic as a democratic political community was provided by his political 
interpretations of the Zagreb crisis. For example: at the Main Committee of the HDZ 
held in February 1996, when the crisis reached its climax, he declared the political be-
haviour of the united opposition to be “attacks on the HDZ”, and concluded that “eve-
rybody unites to fight the HDZ, from the left to the right”. Although he did ask himself 
where the root of such an “improbable union of ‘fascists and communists’ with the sole 
aim to bring HDZ down” lay, the very way of putting the question revealed the utter 
lack of the understanding of the problem. Verbally offering “cooperation to all parties in 
favor of... a democratic and sovereign Croatia” and then marvelling at the lack of re-
sponse to such a call, he denounced the entire political opposition, i.e. the coalition of 
Croatian parliamentary parties, as internal “enemies” (“remnants of the old Yugo-
movement”) who conspire with the external ones. (There are “international circles op-
posed to Croatia”).17 
 But it was probably HDZ’s Presidency press-release on 30 March 30 1996, which 
proclaimed most explicitly the totalitarian features of his policy. In it the Party’s presi-
dency explains to the Croatian public “the core of the problem concerning the constitu-
tion of the Zagreb Assembly”. The fact that no party of the opposition would accept 
“cooperation” which would leave the ruling party in charge, but wished instead to as-
sume the political responsibility in the capital as a coalition and thus break the ruling 
party’s monopoly, is perceived by the HDZ’s presidency as an unprecedented act of 
conspiracy. The HDZ’s presidency even asserted that the coalition “falsely claims to 
speak for the majority of the citizens of Zagreb”, putting forth their own truth: “HDZ is 
the majority party in Zagreb”. Refusing to accept the results of the elections which 
turned the HDZ into an opposition party in Zagreb, its presidency accused the opposi-
tion of wishing to take power! As if the united opposition hadn’t already won the elec-
tions! The elementary ambition of the opposition in Croatia, a democratic state, to go 
further and, if possible, try to replace the HDZ “first in the capital and then, within two 
or three years, together with the President, in the whole of Croatia!” was publicly quali-
 
administration in Article 128 (the complete text of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Croatian Repub-
lic No: U-III-260/96 from May 10, 1996, was published in Novi list, Rijeka, 12 May 1996, pp. 2-3, and in Vjesnik, 
13 May 1996, p. 10). The Assembly resumed its activity, but failed to oust the appointed mayor. We shall stop 
here; instead of a democratic resolution, in accordance with the electoral will of the citizens, the Zagreb crisis re-
sulted in a permanent state of emergency of HDZ’s protectorate over the capital, lasting until the next local elec-
tions in April 1997.  
 17 See the report from the first conference of the Central Committee of the HDZ held on 24 and 25 February 
1996, entitled HDZ osigurao budućnost hrvatske države (HDZ has secured the future of the Croatian state), Ned-
jeljni Vjesnik, 25 February 1996, pp. 3-5. Denouncing the political coalition of the opposition as totally worthless, 
president of the HDZ, in a manner of a par excellence authoritarian politician, reduced Croatia to an animal farm. 
He said: “Their alliance resembles a farm with 60 animals, so that you couldn’t tell which particular animal the 
farmer was talking about. A single pure-bred horse is worth more than the whole pack” (ibid.). 
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fied by the HDZ’s presidency as “the epitome of a hypocrite coalition the like of which 
cannot be found in the democratic world”18. 
 This type of ideological talk full of hatred towards its democratic adversaries (the 
united opposition, of course, did not harbour any “fascists” or “communists”) indeed 
“cannot be found in the democratic world”. It finally and completely laid bare the to-
talitarian traits of the HDZ and its leader. A political party which dared to keep power 
illegitimately (by force), as opposed to the explicit will of the electorate, privatized the 
Croatian State as its property. 
 Following in the footsteps of its wilful and capricious “founding-father”, the HDZ 
proved in the Zagreb crisis that it was ready to violate even the basic democratic rules of 
the pluralistic political process. Having assumed the characteristics of a mere “rassem-
blement for power”, HDZ set out on its post-war path of no return. After that it was 
clear who the chief menace to the constitution of Croatia as a democratic and constitu-
tional state was. 
 
 2.3. One Croatian Democratic Union in Two Different States 
 HDZ’s policy towards BiH deserves a separate study. Still, I must briefly outline the 
issue here because it is precisely the point where the gap between the ideological project 
of national sovereignty and the politico-legal project of the sovereignty of the state of 
Croatia manifested most drastically. It is known that the HDZ does not operate strictly 
within Croatia and does not recognize the electoral will of the citizens of the Republic 
of Croatia, but operates on the territory of the neighbouring state of Bosnia and Herze-
govina as well. Indeed, it has imposed itself there as a hegemonic political formation 
which, in principle, encompasses the whole Croatian national (ethnic) body of BiH. But 
the BiH HDZ is not conceived and organized as an independent party, actively promot-
ing the particular interests of its members (as citizens of BiH) within the framework of 
the state. Instead, it is merely a branch of the national movement with no personal, or-
ganizational or programme autonomy. Refusing to constitute itself as a political party 
within the state in both Croatia and Bosnia (for it would thus cancel its own status of a 
national movement), the HDZ threatened the very existence of a part of the citizens of 
the Croatian State (of Serbian nationality) and a part of the citizens of BiH (of Croatian 
nationality). 
 The policy of the HDZ and its president towards BiH always consisted of two 
contradictory options19. The first, national (state) option was, in principle, in favour of 
BiH as an undivided neighbouring state within the existing borders; it understood and 
 
 18 See Priopćenje Predjedništva Hrvatske demokratske zajednice. Oporba se služi demagoškim smicalicama, 
Vjesnik, 30 March 1996, pp. 4-5. 
 19 Numerous political texts by Ivan Aralica (at that time vicepresident of the HDZ and the House of Counties 
in the Croatian Sabor) offer a paradigmatic testimony to the fundamental dilemmas and the intellectual range of the 
Croatian official policy towards BiH in general, and the Bosniak nation in particular. The texts were published in 
various newspapers and reprinted in books between 1991 and 1994, later to be compiled in Aralica’s book Što sam 
rekao o Bosni, Zagreb: P.I.P. Pavičić, 1995. D. Hlad’s political essays (supra note 2) provide lucid criticism of 
Aralica’s views and of HDZ’s nationalist policy towards BiH, in part. chap. 9-11, pp. 89-112. 
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accepted the fact that the segment of the Croatian national (ethnic) body residing there 
was an integral part of that state. The other, nationalist option was opposed to the con-
cept of BiH as an undivided state, even to the point of waging a war against it to see its 
views prevail. It advocated the “Serbo-Croatian deal”, a division of BiH as an artificial, 
“non-national state”, as a “smaller version of Yugoslavia”. These imperialist views 
harmonized perfectly with the Serbian efforts to divide this neighbouring state. 
 The first option prevailed in HDZ’s policy from 1990 till 1992, at the time when 
Croatia had become independent of the former Yugoslav state and defended itself 
against aggression. It culminated when it encouraged Croats in BiH to vote in favour of 
a “sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina” at the referendum held on 29 
February and 1 March 1992. The Republic of Croatia took part in the international rec-
ognition of the independence of the Bosnian state, a state in which every democratic and 
national right shall be guaranteed to all of its peoples (ethnic groups). The HDZ was one 
of the principal factors in the organization of this state’s defence forces against the ag-
gression on BiH. 
 However, the ideological project of national sovereignty prevailed when the “Cro-
atian Republic Herzeg-Bosnia” was formed on 28 August 1992. It was a “state within 
the state”, with its own territory, government and army. While it formally never ceased 
to recognize the “sovereignty and independence of BiH”, the Croatian policy became 
dominated by the nationalist option. Based on the view that BiH, as an independent 
state, can survive only as a confederation (a union of three national republics)20, the 
HDZ opted for the internal division of BiH, analogous to the already formed “Republika 
Srpska”. This line of action completely transformed the defensive war, fought to protect 
Croatia and BiH, into an annexionist intervention of two Croatian republics against 
BiH21. 
 The catastrophic effects of such an annexionist policy are very well known. The 
self-proclaimed Croatian Republic in BiH has proved to be quite incapable of protecting 
the interests of the Croatian people in Bosnia, while Croatia proper has become a hos-
tage of its own policy of a territorial unification of the Croatian national body i.e. of two 
 
 20 We find one of the many examples to corroborate this in the interview by the Croatian president published 
in the French paper Liberation on 22 July 1993. Explaining the Croatian policy towards BiH, he asserted that the 
“confederalization of Bosnia” is the “only chance” for BiH to survive as an “undivided state”; BiH can function as 
a “community of three peoples” if it can offer a satisfying solution for all of them. If not, then “three separate 
States” will be formed, “subsequently joining their ‘mother-States’” (Quoted according to M. Galić’s report from 
Paris BiH – konfederacija, Večernji list, 23 July 1993, p. 3. 
 21 The irresponsible policy is precisely what motivated the head of the Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II, to 
issue a very precise and important warning to the Croatian President (as the one most responsible) during his first 
visit to Croatia. He pointed out that “the Croatian people has enjoyed permanent support from Rome throughout the 
centuries, encouraging them to live peacefully together with the neighbouring peoples. As you know, Croats have 
formed a sort of an alliance with Pope Agaton, obliging themselves to live in peace with the neighbouring peoples, 
and it is in that sense that I am addressing you, mister President...” See Slobodna Dalmacija, 12 September 1994, p. 
6 (italics added). He is referring to a written contract put together in the year 680, in which Croats, according to 
Constantine VII Porphyrogenet, “vowed by their sturdy, undying faith to Peter the Holy Apostle, never to invade 
other countries under arms...” See Ive Livljanić, Odnosi Svete Stolice i Hrvatske (1), Vjesnik, 4 September 1994, p. 
12.  
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Croatian “republics” into a “larger” Croatian state22. It has become obvious that the 
process of the constitution of Croatia as a sovereign state, as one capable of “limiting its 
power to people residing on its own territory”, is at stake or even impossible if BiH is 
not constituted as a sovereign state23. 
 A military and political intervention of the international community was necessary – 
after Croatia had suffered heavy losses of human and material resources in the war 
against the BiH army – to steer the Croatian policy back to the position of principle. The 
Washington Agreement (in March 1994) and the Dayton Agreement (in December 
1995)24 “imposed freedom” on HDZ in both states and on its political leader. They were 
forced to submit to the rules and standards of international law – in both states. The war 
against BiH was finally stopped and the international community, on the grounds of the 
peace agreements, turned BiH into a permanent and direct protectorate, turning Croatia 
into an indirect and temporary one as well. 
 
 3. Conclusion: an authoritarian state with strong totalitarian features 
 This analysis shows that the HDZ was the principal source of totalitarian tendencies 
in the state of Croatia between 1990-1999. But these tendencies were not predominant 
traits of the Croatian political and social order, since the HDZ did not have enough 
ideological and political power to reshape the Croatian state and society to its liking. In 
my opinion, the post-war Croatia did not become a totalitarian community, but an au-
thoritarian state with strong and distinct totalitarian features as well as with an incresing 
democratic and liberal potential. 
 
 22 At the time when the war between the Croats and the Bosniaks in BiH was raging, the House of Representa-
tives of the Croatian Sabor, at the session held on 7 September 1993, basically supported the Croatian govern-
ment’s current foreign policy. Although the discussion included claims that the proclamation of the Croatian Re-
public Herzeg-Bosnia was “the first step towards the division of BiH”, the conclusion that the “establishment of the 
Croatian Republic Herzeg-Bosnia... is a political act which is one of the modes of realizing the sovereign rights of 
the Croatian people, as one of the three constitutive peoples of BiH”, was accepted by the majority vote. In addi-
tion, the House of Representatives “expresses concern with regard to the development of the situation in BiH” and 
“condemns the aggression of the Serbs and Muslims against the Croatian people and its territories in BiH”. Comp. 
Prihvaćen amandman oporbe o Herceg-Bosni i Hrvatima u BiH , Vjesnik, 8 September 1993, pp. 1-3. 
 23 The function of sovereignty is decisive in international relations: “By attributing sovereignty to the state, a 
formal equality is attributed to all states and a rational principle is thus introduced into an anarchic state system. As 
a polemical notion, state sovereignty in international politics rejects the sovereign claims of races and classes over 
citizens of other states, thus limiting the state’s power to people residing in a specific territory. The notion of state 
sovereignty is thus basically anti-imperialist”. See Franz L. Neumann (note 2), p. 182. 
 24 First of all, there were the following documents: The Agreement on the Federation of Croats and Muslims 
in BiH (including a draft of the Constitution of BiH Federation) and the Framework Agreement on the Establish-
ment of the Confederation between the BiH Federation and the Republic of Croatia; those agreements were reached 
in Washington on 18 March 1994. Then came the General Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, officially signed in Paris, on 14 December 1995. It was an agreement between the Republic of BiH, the Re-
public of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ), previously stipulated in Dayton, USA, thanks to 
the American officials, in November. The “Dayton” peace agreement also contains, in annex no. IV, the text of the 
BiH Constitution, laying the foundation for what is “probably the most complex form of government the world has 
ever known”. Comp. Smiljko Sokol, Branko Smerdel, Ustavno pravo, Zagreb: Informator, 1998, pp. 296-299. 
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 The peace agreements concerning BiH have put an end to the ideological project of 
national sovereignty on the foreign policy level. Through systematic and determined 
pressures of the international community, both diplomatic and military, the Croatian of-
ficial policy has been directed towards the realization of the politico-legal programme of 
the constitution of state sovereignty. In that respect, the common view of the OESS, the 
European Council, the USA and the European Union on the electoral process in Croatia 
is most revealing. A recent document issued by those institutions of the international 
community contains very precise assessments: 1. giving Croatian citizenship and the 
right to vote to ethnic Croats in BiH and reserving places in the parliament for special 
representatives elected by voters residing outside the country is contrary to the essence 
of representative democracy: 2. “by imposing political and administrative obstacles, the 
Croatian government has de facto cancelled and withheld the right of citizenship, and 
thereby the right to participate in the 1995 and 1997 elections, from a population of 
300.000 Croatian inhabitants who have lived there for a long time and are of voting age. 
This applies, above all, to the ethnic Serbs residing in SRJ and BiH”25. The imposition 
of such democratic legal standards would compel the HDZ to become a political party 
which operates in the democratic political process within the Croatian State. 
 On the internal level, the collapse of the ideological project of national sovereignty 
was manifest in HDZ’s incapability of constituting the Croatian state as a rational in-
strumentation, the necessary prerequisite for the development of a modern civil society 
in Croatia. Within the state of Croatia, the totalitarian project succeeded in forming 
some sort of a feudal-estate order. Its traits were easy to perceive: the malignant amal-
gam of political power and economic domination, the militarization of the social field 
and the mythologization of the “ideological sector”, a static economy (“a stable kuna”) 
instead of a dynamic market economy, the lawlessness of Behemoth instead of the rule 
of law. But it was precisely the success of the project that brought about its downfall. In 
its attempts to systemically replace the state in the regulation of social life, the HDZ fell 
into a deep and permanent crisis. Political scandals, mutual recriminations and embez-
zlement which shook its foundations testified to HDZ’s incapability of governing the 
Croatian society and solving a single Croatian developmental and social problem. 
 The Croatian Second Republic has withstood the assault of the ideological project of 
national sovereignty. We must keep in mind that the project was not characteristic of the 
HDZ alone. No, it shaped the profile of the other political parties in Croatia as well, at 
least until 1994/95. The temptations of the opposition activity as the one which protects 
the general interests of the state against the particular interests and abuses of the party in 
power, have by now (or so it seems) finally taught the relevant opposition parties to act 
together as a democratic “rassemblement in defence of the Republic” (and of the insti-
tution of the presidency of the Republic of Croatia) against the populist “rassemblement 
for power” in service of the HDZ’s late president’s mode of rule. 
 
 25 The document was put together by an operative group of representatives of the OESS Mission and the Euro-
pean Council, and it was subsequently backed by the EU and the US. The document suggests that the electoral law 
be altered “in the sense of cancelling special mandates reserved for voters residing outside the country”. It further 
requests the Croatian government to “see that the right of citizenship be confirmed as soon as possible to every citi-
zen entitled to that right, so that they should be enabled to vote on the next elections”. Comp. Od Hrvatske se traži 
promjena Zakona o državljanstvu i ukidanje liste za dijasporu, Jutarnji list, 22 October 1998, p. 5. 
